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From Honeymoon to Hangover: 
Resetting Australia’s Relations with China 
GIGA Focus | Asia | Number 4 | October 2018 | ISSN 1862-359X
Australia has recently adopted a more robust stance towards China, culmi-
nating in new legislation on espionage and foreign interference. In econom-
ic terms, Australia has greatly benefitted from China’s rise. In more recent 
times, however, concerns about Chinese interference in domestic politics as 
well as the PRC’s assertiveness and influence-seeking in parts of Pacific Asia 
have come to the fore.
 • Rapid increases in trade, tourism, and higher education-related exchange with 
China have helped to boost economic growth in Australia in recent years, while 
the respective governments have elevated bilateral relations to ever-higher levels.
 • Public opinion about the growing ties with China has been more ambivalent, 
however. Especially since summer 2017, growing domestic concerns have been 
fuelled by reports about covert efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to influ-
ence both domestic politics and the public sphere in Australia.
 • Concerns have also grown about China’s increasing assertiveness in the South 
China Sea as well as influence-seeking behaviour in the South Pacific, a region 
of key strategic importance to Australia. What unites these domestic and inter-
national worries is a focus on threats to national security and rule-based order.
 • The changing political mood has led to revamped internally and externally ori-
ented security policies in Australia. These will provide government authorities 
with more military hardware and legal software. Initial Chinese reactions to 
the new policy directions have been harsh. The government in Canberra has 
recently sought to mend these frayed ties, but the honeymoon phase in bilateral 
relations is clearly now over.
Policy Implications
European Union member states and Australia share an interest in defending the 
rule of law at home, and also in promoting a liberal rules-based international 
order at large. They thus need to rebut foreign, not just Chinese, interference in 
domestic politics. In doing this, however, they should avoid scapegoating, and 
focus on fixing domestic legal loopholes. Policymakers and non-governmental 
actors in the European Union and Australia should also use bi- and multilateral 
dialogue formats to discuss perspectives and initiatives regarding both foreign 
interference and upholding the liberal rules-based international order.
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Critical Concerns about China: Any Lessons from Australia?
Economic and official relations between Australia and China have mushroomed 
since the early 2000s. In more recent times, however, critical concerns have arisen 
in Australia about not only China’s growing assertiveness and influence in regions 
close to Australia’s own borders but also about foreign – in particular Chinese – 
interference in Australia’s domestic politics as well as public sphere. Canberra has 
reacted to these concerns by, among other things, introducing new legislation on 
foreign interference and espionage. What, if anything, can actors in the European 
Union (EU) learn from Australia’s shifting policies towards China? In this briefing 
paper, I first sketch the rise of economic and other ties between Australia and China 
before tracing the recent “reset” of their relations. I then address the implications of 
this reset for European policymakers and for interested stakeholders.
The Honeymoon: Australia’s Growing Economic and Diplomatic 
Ties with China
Since the early 2000s, China has come to play an ever-larger role in the economic 
fortunes of Australia. This development reflects the complementary character of the 
two economies and China’s own spectacular rise, and with it a substantial demand 
for goods and services that Australia can offer. Government and corporate actors in 
Australia have been interested in nurturing trade, and in tapping into new sources 
for investment and spending in sectors such as tourism and education. China has 
effectively become a major driver for Australia’s own recent economic trajectory, 
helping the latter not only to weather the global and financial crisis but, more gen-
erally, to sustain its remarkable growth path – which has not seen a recession hit 
the country in 27 years now.
Since 2007 China has been Australia’s largest trading partner for goods and 
services (cf. Köllner 2013). In the financial year 2016–2017, the PRC accounted for 
nearly one-quarter of Australia’s total trade – with China-related commerce being 
equal to roughly the same share as that with Australia’s next-three-largest trading 
partners combined. Notably, China is by now the leading trade partner for all six 
states within the Commonwealth of Australia and looms particularly large for the 
natural resources sector – which is of great importance for  Australian exports and 
indeed the economy overall. In the financial year 2016–2017, iron ore and concen-
trates accounted in terms of total value for over 17 per cent of all Australian goods 
and services exports, making them the most important such item (followed by coal, 
education-related services, and natural gas). China takes in around 80 per cent of 
these iron ore exports.
The picture is somewhat different with respect to foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Substantial growth of FDI from China notwithstanding, in relative terms the 
actual flows – let alone the stock of Chinese direct investment – remain of limited 
importance to Australia. The stock of Chinese FDI in Australia at the end of 2017 
amounted to AUD 65 billion (approximately EUR 47 billion), or just 2 per cent of 
the total – making China only the ninth-largest source of aggregate FDI in Australia. 
The year 2017 actually saw a substantial net outflow of Chinese FDI from Australia. 
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The education sector in Australia has also benefitted substantially from the 
growing number of full-fee-paying Chinese students enrolled in its higher educa-
tion institutions, language schools, and beyond. As noted above, international edu-
cation is Australia’s third-largest export, reaching a record high of AUD 28 billion 
in the 2016–2017 financial year. China is Australia’s single-most important source 
of international students. In 2017 over 230,000 Chinese students were enrolled in 
Australian educational institutions, making up close to 30 per cent of the interna-
tional student body. For a number of tertiary education institutions, in particular 
universities and departments thereof, this share is much higher still. China has also 
been a major growth engine for Australia’s tourism sector in recent years. In 2017 
China was Australia’s second-largest inbound market for visitor arrivals (1.35 mil-
lion, just behind New Zealand) and its outright largest in terms of total spending and 
visitor nights spent in the country. The Australian government expects that by 2020 
Chinese tourists will account for over 25 per cent of the domestic tourism market.
The very dynamic development of Australia’s economic engagement with China 
over the past 10 years and longer has been accompanied and supported by active 
diplomatic efforts at the highest levels of government. These have led to a substan-
tial upgrading and broadening of bilateral relations. Australian–Chinese relations 
were elevated to the level of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in November 
2014, and in late 2015 a bilateral free trade agreement entered into force too. An-
nual meetings bring together the Australian and Chinese premiers, while a high-
level security dialogue with the Central Commission for Political and Legal Affairs 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was held for the first time in April 2017. 
During the last leaders’ meeting in March 2017, then Australian prime minister 
(PM) Malcolm Turnbull and Chinese PM Li Keqiang agreed on a flurry of new initia-
tives – including bilateral dialogues on energy and innovation, plus the opening of 
an Australian consulate in Shenyang.
The Hangover: Australia Resets Its Policy towards China
None of the just-mentioned initiatives had been implemented as of mid-2018 how-
ever. Effectively, high-level diplomatic relations between Australia and China have 
been on freeze for most of 2018. An editorial of China’s international news organ, 
the Global Times, went so far as to argue in May 2018 that “Australia’s relations 
with China are among the worst of all Western nations.” Even threats were un-
veiled: “The China–Australia relationship doesn’t carry much weight in Beijing dip-
lomacy, and Chinese have no sense of urgency to improve ties with Canberra. But 
the situation is different for Australia. China has tremendous influence on Austra-
lia’s development. Canberra will certainly feel uneasy for upsetting ties with Bei-
jing” (Global Times 2018). 
Why and how did things go that far downhill in such a short space of time? The 
story behind this increasingly troubled relationship between China and Australia is 
complex. It has both domestic and international dimensions – ones that are, at least 
to some extent, intertwined.
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Domestic Dimensions of the Post-Honeymoon Phase
Despite the very dynamic development of bilateral economic ties and the upgrad-
ing-cum-broadening of government-to-government relations in the past few years, 
public opinion about those bilateral connections as well as about China’s role in 
the Australian economy has been fairly ambivalent throughout (cf. Köllner 2013). 
According to the most recent poll of the Lowy Institute, the vast majority of sur-
veyed Australians (82 per cent in 2018) see China as more of an economic partner 
to Australia whereas only a minority (12 per cent) believe China to be more of a 
military threat (Oliver 2018: 11). Also, China’s growing power is seen as far less of 
a threat to Australia than, for example, international terrorism or, for that matter, 
the presidency of Donald Trump. Still, 36 per cent of the surveyed Australians see 
China’s growing power as a “critical threat” to Australia while 50 per cent believe it 
presents an important but not critical threat – while only 13 per cent think that it 
does not present a significant threat at all (Oliver 2018: 8). 
Despite the above-mentioned limited flows and stock of Chinese FDI in Austra-
lia, 72 per cent of respondents say that Australia allows too much investment from 
China. Chinese FDI in agriculture, residential real estate, and in “critical infrastruc-
ture” such as ports and airports troubles Australians the most (Oliver 2018: 10). 
These concerns reflect, among other things, skyrocketing real estate prices in Syd-
ney and other Australian metropolises, as well as high-profile Chinese investments 
in Australian infrastructure. In particular, the 2015 decision by the Northern Ter-
ritory government to sign together with China’s Landbridge corporation a 99-year 
lease of the port of Darwin, which includes a supply base for the United States Ma-
rine Corps, caused a ruckus in Australia. Andrew Robb, the then federal minister for 
trade and investment, defended the agreement as a “powerful sign of the enhanced 
commercial relationship between Australia and China flowing from the China–Aus-
tralia free trade agreement” (The Guardian 2015).
Public concern about foreign influence or interference in Australian politics has 
also come to the fore in more recent times. In 2018, some 89 per cent of those (Austra-
lians) surveyed by the Lowy Institute believe such interference to pose a critical (41 per 
cent) or at least an important threat (48 per cent) to Australia (Oliver 2018: 8). The 
focus is very much herein on Chinese influence, whereas that from the US and other 
countries besides has received far less attention in the public and political discourse. 
More specifically, 63 per cent of the respondents are personally concerned about 
Chinese influence in Australia’s political processes (Oliver 2018: 9), which has been 
a hot topic in Australia since mid-2017. In June of that year an investigative re-
port aired at prime time by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) cast 
light on Chinese influence over Australia’s domestic politics. The report accused the 
government in Beijing of organising Chinese students in Australia to demonstrate 
on behalf of Chinese state interests, and of setting up spy networks within these 
student communities. The report also revealed opaque political donations from 
Chinese and Australian–Chinese businessmen to Australian policymakers. Other 
large-scale donations have been channeled to universities and think tanks mean-
while (ABC News 2017). Speculation was rife that these donations were at least in 
part undertaken to obtain access and influence. It also became known that Chinese 
corporations had offered lucrative jobs to former Australian policymakers. Former 
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trade and investment minister Robb even signed a highly-paid consultant contract 
with Landbridge one day before leaving parliament in early 2016.
Counter-Interference Legislation and Other Steps Taken by the  
Australian Government 
Particular concern has been caused by the covert activities of the CCP’s United 
Front Work Department (UFWD), which is tasked, among other things, with polit-
ical-influence activities abroad. According to the political scientist and China expert 
Anne-Marie Brady, the UFWD has focused under Xi Jinping on: strengthening “ef-
forts to manage and guide overseas Chinese communities and utilise them as agents 
of Chinese foreign policy”; re-emphasising “people-to-people, party-to-party, plus 
PRC enterprise-to-foreign-enterprise relations, with the aim of coopting foreigners 
to support and promote the CCP’s foreign policy goals”; the rolling out of “a global, 
multi-platform, strategic communication strategy”; and, the “formation of a China-
centered economic and strategic bloc” (Brady 2017: 7). Also due to prominent in-
vestigative reports in international media (e.g. Kynge, Hornby, and Anderlini 2017), 
the activities of the UFWD – which Mao Zedong once called one of the CCP’s “magic 
weapons” – have caught the attention and imagination of policymakers, executive 
agencies, and concerned citizens both in and beyond Australia’s shores.
Not only Australia but also New Zealand (see Brady 2017) have both figured 
as prominent targets of UFWD efforts, as well as of other attempts at influencing 
political and public discourse in China’s favour (see also, Fitzgerald 2018). Both 
countries are of multilayered interest to China given, among other things, their 
manifold ties to it, their economic assets, and their memberships in various military 
and intelligence-sharing alliances. Australia, for example, is allied to the US, and 
belongs to the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing community (along with New Zea-
land, the US, the United Kingdom, and Canada). Both of these countries are liberal 
democracies that do not, however, have a tradition of substantial state funding for 
political parties. Fundraising is thus a vital issue for both party leaders and aspiring 
politicians in each, providing entry points for political access and influence-seeking 
activities by foreign actors. One of the biggest political scandals in Australia in 2017 
saw the downfall and eventual resignation of Labor Party senator Sam Dastyari, 
who had advocated for accepting Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea – 
he was later found to have accepted substantial donations from a Chinese billion-
aire real-estate magnate residing in Australia.
The welter of media and academic reporting on Chinese influence-seeking ac-
tivities in Australia, coupled with repeated warnings from Australia’s own intel-
ligence agencies, and culminating in the Dastyari affair prompted the Australian 
government to introduce in December 2017 counter-interference legislation. In 
late June 2018, after six months of negotiations and debate, the amended counter-
interference law – the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and 
Foreign Interference) Act 2018 – passed with bipartisan support in both houses of 
the federal parliament in Canberra. The act, which amends the criminal code and 
various forms of government legislation, defines foreign interference and stipulates 
harsh penalties for related offenses. The act also requires foreign lobbyists to regis-
   6    GIGA FOCUS | ASIA | NO. 4 | OCTOBER 2018 
ter with the authorities, and provides for greater transparency concerning political 
donations. “The China reset has begun,” notes John Garnaut (2018: 24) in a recent 
article discussing the darker dimensions of China’s outreach activities in Australia. 
Garnaut and other concerned Australian observers, such as John Fitzgerald (2018), 
have also argued that the CCP is systematically attempting to silence critics and to 
co-opt Chinese-language media in Australia to present favourable views. A similar 
point is made at length in Clive Hamilton’s (2018) controversial book about China’s 
role in Australia’s domestic politics and public sphere, which has further fuelled the 
very animated public debate on this subject in Australia.
Apart from the Foreign Interference Act, the federal government in Canberra 
has also taken a number of other noteworthy steps. Already in 2017, it decided not 
to ratify a bilateral extradition treaty with China. This was due to concerns about 
the violation of human rights in China – here, the rights of prisoners – which came 
to the fore when the federal parliament debated the treaty. After it had become 
clear that the Senate might block the treaty, the government decided to pull the 
plug on it in March 2017. More recently, Canberra decided to block the Chinese-
owned telecommunications corporation Huawei from being involved in the rolling 
out of Australia’s 5G mobile network. The government, led by new PM Scott Mor-
rison, explained that the involvement of a company “likely to be subject to extraju-
dicial directions from a foreign government” presented too much of a national risk 
(Wyeth 2018). It remains to be seen whether the decision will be a harbinger for 
similar future ones concerning Chinese investments in “critical infrastructure” in 
Australia, or whether it will be an exception due to the particular technical and se-
curity risks involved in this specific case.
International Dimensions of the Post-Honeymoon Phase 
Australian concerns about Chinese activities and interference have not been limited 
to domestic issues either. Especially since 2016, unease has grown about China’s in-
creasing assertiveness in the South China Sea as well as expanding presence in the 
South Pacific. These two regions, situated in Australia’s neighbourhood, are of sub-
stantial strategic interest to the government in Canberra, also given the country’s 
own huge exclusive economic zone in surrounding seas as well as its concomitant 
interest in rules-based ocean governance. 
The decision of the Chinese government not to accept the July 2016 ruling of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, a tribunal established under Annex VII of the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), shattered any 
remaining hopes concerning a rules-based solution to territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea. The Chinese decision to reject the ruling – which stated, among 
other things, that China had “no historical rights” based on the so-called “nine-dash 
line” map to territory also claimed by the Philippines – did not come as a surprise. 
But the rejection of the ruling, combined with China’s preceding fortification of is-
lands and other territories in the South China Sea, made it plain that security risks 
in the area were now on the rise. It also showed that a “no worries” attitude to Aus-
tralia’s balancing of strategic ties with, on the one hand, China and, on the other, 
the US – as the country’s key security partner – was misplaced (cf. Köllner 2013). 
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The rejection of the ruling thus constituted a veritable “aha!” moment for policy-
makers in Australia. 
Speaking at the Shangri-La security dialogue in Singapore in June 2017, then 
Australian PM Turnbull urged China to respect “the sovereignty of others.” With 
hindsight, this could be read not just as a critique of China’s expansive territorial 
claims in the South China Sea but also of influence-seeking activities within Aus-
tralia itself. Turnbull’s speech followed up on the government’s 2016 Defence White 
Paper and set the tone for the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper too. Both policy 
documents note growing security risks in maritime Asia – or the “Indo-Pacific,” 
in geostrategic parlance in Australia and beyond – with the Foreign Policy White 
Paper expressing particular concern about the “unprecedented pace and scale” of 
China’s activities in the South China Sea (Australian Government 2017: 47). 
More generally, China is seen as challenging America’s position in the region. 
In this context, the Australian government emphasises the need for a strong US 
presence in the region and for close ties with Washington. The Foreign Policy White 
Paper also calls for greater security cooperation with other nations in the Indo-
Pacific and, in this and other domains, for tight-knit cooperation with “the region’s 
major democracies” – namely the US, Japan, Indonesia, India, and the Republic 
of Korea (Australian Government 2017: 4). Both white papers point to the growing 
importance of closer engagement by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in the re-
gion too. The ADF will in fact see very substantial investments in military hardware 
over the next few decades – including the procurement of new submarines, naval 
frigates, and armoured vehicles (Grigg and Tillett 2018). 
A particular concern of policymakers in Australia has been China’s growing 
presence in the South Pacific, a world region that has been at the centre of Aus-
tralia’s security and development initiatives over the past few decades. Through its 
expanding diplomatic, trade, and investment networks in – and especially its grow-
ing aid to – the region, China is seen to be challenging Australia’s position in the 
neighbouring South Pacific. Strategic circles in Canberra are especially worried that 
Chinese loans to South Pacific nations will lead to economic and ultimately political 
dependency on the part of the latter vis-à-vis China. 
Policymakers also worry that China’s apparent interest in port development in 
Papua New Guinea (PNG), as well as elsewhere in the region, might also be motivated 
by its aspiration to set up a military base in that part of the Pacific. Whether such 
concerns are well founded or not, Australia and also New Zealand have in both 2017 
and again in 2018 intensified their own diplomatic efforts in the South Pacific. They 
have also tried to alert regional leaders to the risks of accepting large loans, and to lay 
the groundwork for more intensive security-related cooperation among Pacific Islands 
Forum member states (which include Australia and New Zealand), culminating in the 
Boe Declaration of September 2018. In more material terms, New Zealand’s govern-
ment decided in early 2018 to substantially beef up development funds earmarked for 
South Pacific countries; Australia has agreed to fund and build an underwater Inter-
net cable network between PNG, the Solomon Islands, and Australia meanwhile. Such 
a cable was originally supposed to be installed by Huawei. Again, security concerns 
loomed large in the Australian government’s decision to step in here. 
The 2018 Foreign Interference Act alongside other recent steps taken by the 
Australian government in the domestic domain too, the equipment upgrade of the 
ADF currently underway, as well as the renewed focus on strengthening coopera-
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tion with South Pacific nations have all been motivated to a significant degree by 
growing security concerns connected both to China’s rise and to the CCP’s overseas 
activities. Collectively, the steps taken by the Australian government will provide 
Canberra with the legal software and military hardware to better address these do-
mestic and international security concerns. What, beyond these concerns, links the 
steps taken or currently underway in the domestic and international domains is the 
aim of upholding – and where necessary defending – rules-based orders. To ward 
off foreign interference in domestic politics and the public sphere requires effective 
rule of law at home, while robust rules-based orders at the regional and global levels 
can buttress international stability and prosperity. Chinese outreach and influence-
seeking activities in Australia will now need to comply with revamped domestic 
laws, while the former’s cooperation will nevertheless still be vital for the existence 
and effective operation of a rules-based international order. 
Notwithstanding the reset, the government in Canberra has emphasised that 
Australia remains very much open to cooperation with China and also to the Stra-
tegic Partnership. In a China-focused speech given in Sydney in early August 2018, 
then PM Turnbull struck a conciliatory tone while reiterating the need to “ensure 
the independence of our decision-making and secure the safety and freedom of our 
people.” He also affirmed Australia’s support for an “international order based on 
the rule of law where might is not right and the sovereignty of all nations is re-
spected by others.” The PM then declared that Australia was pursuing relations 
with China “based on mutual respect and understanding,” and emphasised that 
Australia continued to welcome students, tourists, researchers, and investors from 
China while noting that “modern Australia is unimaginable without the talented 
and dynamic contribution of Australians of Chinese descent” (Turnbull 2018). 
The speech clearly ran counter to hardline stances in both Canberra and Bei-
jing, and was meant to cool tempers in the two countries. The speech’s conciliatory 
tone was not lost on China. Whereas the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper had been 
met by harsh criticism from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and by 
scornful commentary from Global Times editorialists, reactions to the speech by 
Turnbull were equally conciliatory. The MFA let it be known that it appreciated the 
speech’s tone and its focus on pragmatic cooperation. It also noted that the “healthy 
and stable development of bilateral relations was in the fundamental interests of 
both countries” (Needham 2018). Official relations between Australia and China 
might thus now be in the process of being slowly repaired, but there is certainly no 
possibility of a return to the two countries’ earlier honeymoon phase all the same.
Lessons from Australia’s Resetting of Ties with China 
Are there any lessons that policymakers and interested stakeholders in the EU can 
learn from Australia’s resetting of relations with China? Certainly, democracies in 
Oceania – such as Australia and New Zealand – and in the EU share a common 
interest in defending the rule of law at home and in upholding a liberal rules-based 
international order at large. They need to be vigilant about foreign – not simply Chi-
nese – attempts to interfere in domestic politics and the public sphere. Examples 
of unacceptable foreign interference include tampering with election processes and 
attempts to buy political access to and gaining confidential information from both 
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policymakers as well as their staff. The rebuttal of such nefarious activities needs to 
be based on clear and transparent laws and regulations – in other words, on the rule 
of law. Where necessary, such laws and regulations need to be amended, updated, 
and clarified – for example with respect to foreign political donations, foreign lob-
bying activities, and the like. In this context governments and parliaments in the 
EU need to avoid the witch-hunting and easy scapegoating of China or indeed other 
foreign actors, and should first and foremost focus instead on doing their home-
work in terms of fixing legal loopholes.
How much such homework is actually required will differ from country to coun-
try. It is also very important in this regard not to overshoot, meaning that relevant 
rules and regulations must not infringe on the civic rights and political freedoms 
of citizens in the countries concerned. Such legal stipulations are, after all, about 
protecting – not undermining – the rule of law in liberal democracies. Civil society 
actors, in turn, need to be vigilant about any clampdowns on such rights and free-
doms in the name of “national interests.” They also need to be on guard about pos-
sible sell-outs of public services. A good example of such vigilance is provided by the 
activities of employees of the ABC who laid bare (and helped to unmake) a deal that 
sacrificed reporting on sensitive issues in the ABC’s Chinese-language programmes 
in exchange for greater access for its English-language ones in China itself.
Upholding the rules-based international order is, as noted, another priority for 
the EU, its member states, and liberal democracies in Oceania – who are natural 
partners in this regard. What unites these various countries is a focus on a rules-
based international order that seeks to protect and promote, on a global scale, lib-
eral values such as the rule of law, democracy, and human rights. The focus is thus 
not just on a rules-based international order per se – an aim that countries such as 
China can also easily subscribe to (even if the interpretation of relevant rules might 
differ). Policymakers, executive agencies, and interested stakeholders – including 
non-governmental actors – in the EU and Oceania should also use existing bi- and 
multilateral dialogue formats, alongside establishing new ones, so as to understand 
relevant perspectives and experiences in both world regions – as well as to discuss 
practices and joint initiatives with respect to dealing with both foreign interference 
and with regard to the upholding of the liberal rules-based international order.
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